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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Appellant, Vance Watkins, appeals his conviction for lewd conduct with a
minor under the age of sixteen.

A jury found Watkins guilty of lewd and

lascivious conduct after he engaged in repeated sex acts with his six-year-old
daughter.
Background
Watkins' opening brief claimed the district court violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confront by allowing testimony from Dr. Carla J. Finis, the
director of a scientific laboratory, regarding her lab's procedure for handling
evidence and her conclusions based on raw DNA data gathered by a technician.
(Appellant's Opening Brief, p.1.) In response, the state asserted that Watkins'
argument was without merit because Watkins did not object to the statements on
Sixth Amendment grounds, failed to identify any out-of-court statements
constituting hearsay statements, and failed to show how any admitted hearsay
statements were testimonial. (State's Response Brief, p.4.)
In support of the last issue -- whether any admitted hearsay statements
were testimonial -- the state cited to a number of post-Crawford cases from other
jurisdictions holding that scientific lab reports are not testimonial hearsay.
(State's Response Brief, p.4.) Watkins' reply brief addressed the state's claim
that his Sixth Amendment arguments were barred (Appellant's Reply Brief, pp.47) and that there were no testimonial hearsay statements admitted at trial.
(Appellant's Reply Brief, pp.8-9). Watkins did not address the non-Idaho case
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law cited by the state. Watkins did, however, raise a new argument: That Dr.
Finis' testimony as to "what Mr. Channell [the lab technician] did in handling and
testing the evidence at issue in this case is also inadmissible hearsay under
I.R.E. 801 and 802." (Appellant's Reply Brief, p.10.)
Subsequent to the case being set for oral argument, this Court ordered
Watkins to submit supplemental briefing addressing the "decisions from other
jurisdictions, issued since Davis v. Washington, --- U.S. ---, 126 S.Ct. 2266
(2006), addressing whether the Confrontation Clause bars admission of
laboratory tests reports, autopsy reports and similar evidence analogous to that
presented in this case." (Order for Supplemental Brief, p.1.) In response to that
order, Watkins filed a supplemental brief. The state now responds.
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ARGUMENT

I.
A Review Of Post-Crawford/Davis Case Law From Other Jurisdictions
Establishes That A DNA Lab Report That Does Not Include Accusatory
Conclusions Is Not Testimonial Evidence
A.

Introduction
Watkins' supplemental brief identifies 130 cases from 45 jurisdictions.

These

cases

"address

Confrontation

Clause-based

challenges

to

the

government's use of documentary evidence" against the accused. (Appellant's
Supp. Brief, p.5.)

Watkins did not limit his review to cases "addressing whether

the Confrontation Clause bars admission of laboratory test reports, autopsy
reports and similar evidence" since Davis. (Order for Supplemental Briefing.)
Watkins claims that his more expansive review of case law is necessary to
"provide this Court with a clearer picture of how Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence has changed, and is still changing, in the various jurisdictions after
the watershed

Crawford

(v.

Washington,

541

U.S.

36

(2004)]

case."

(Appellant's Supp. Brief, p.5.) Watkins' expansive review obfuscates important
distinctions.

First, that case law addressing the issue of whether the

Confrontation Clause bars admission of laboratory test reports can be divided
into two categories: Those cases that base their Crawford analysis on whether a
lab report is a business document and those that consider whether the
information in the lab report is a statement that describes a past fact related to
criminal activity created for possible use at a later trial. Second, a review limited
to cases involving just DNA lab reports, the kind of report at issue here, shows
that an important and controlling consideration is whether the information in the
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lab report is limited to raw non-accusatory data or includes accusatory
conclusions linking a defendant to criminal activity. This limited review shows
that no court has ever found that a DNA lab report limited to neutral DNA
information constitutes a testimonial hearsay statement that a defendant has a
right to confront.
8.

Lab Reports That Contain Raw Data. As Opposed To Accusatory
Conclusions Against A Defendant, Are Not Testimonial
Watkins' assertion that the cases are "all over the map" is misleading.

The seminal cases from state supreme courts and United States circuit courts of
appeal dealing with Confrontation Clause rights pertaining to scientific lab reports
can be divided into two primary categories:

First, there are courts that have

relied on the "business records" language in Crawford as a basis for categorically
excluding scientific lab reports as testimonial evidence. The second category of
courts have applied a three-part test taken from language collectively set forth in
Crawford and Davis -- 1) whether the out-of-court statement was made to a law
enforcement officer or by or to a law enforcement agent, see Crawford, 541 U.S.
at 53, and 2) whether the statement describes a past fact related to criminal
activity, for 3) possible use at a later trial, see Davis, --- U.S. at---, 126 S.Ct. at
2273-74.
Cases dealing with DNA lab reports are no different. A review of these
cases show that courts have either considered the lab report a business or public
record or, applying the three-factor inquiry (focusing on the second factor),
concluded that a nonconclusory lab report did not describe a past fact related to
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criminal activity. Under either framework, courts have consistently held that lab
reports such as the one at issue in this case are non-testimonial.

1.

Scientific Lab Reports Are Business Records And Are. Therefore.
Nontestimonial

The Supreme Court has said the "testimonial" characterization "applies at
a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial and to police interrogations. "Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47-49, 51-52.
The Court stressed that the core concern behind the Confrontation Clause is ex
parte testimony or its functional equivalent. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47-49, 51-52.
The Supreme Court also recognized that: "[m]ost of the hearsay exceptions
covered statements that by their nature [are] not testimonial -- for example
business records .... " !.!;!,_ at 56.
At least one federal circuit and four state supreme courts have relied on
this business records exception in concluding that a scientific lab report is not
testimonial (either because the report constituted a business record or had
characteristics similar to business records). See United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d
227, 237 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding autopsy report is a public record that, like a
business record "falls outside the 'testimonial' ambit of the Confrontation
Clause"); Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 2005)
(concluding chemical analysis report was "akin to a business or official record,
which the [Crawford] Court stated was not testimonial in nature"); State v. Forte,
629 S.E.2d 137, 142-43 (N.C. 2006) (concluding autopsy report was a business
record and therefore not testimonial); State v. Cutro, 618 S.E.2d 890, 896 (S.C.
2005) (finding that autopsy report was a "public record, is not testimonial and
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[that) its admission similarly does not violate defendant's confrontation rights");
State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621 (Ohio 2006) (concluding autopsy reports are not
testimonial under Crawford on grounds that such reports are "quintessential
business records"). 1
At least one court has applied this reasoning to a DNA lab report that
provided the basis for expert witness testimony at trial. In People v. Brown, 801
N.Y.S.2d 709, 713 (N.Y. Sup. 2005), the New York appellate court cited the
reasoning of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Verde and concluded: "The
DNA testing records in this case, likewise, are not the type of testimonial
evidence the Supreme Court in Crawford intended to exclude. Rather, the DNA
files are the type of business records which Crawford held not to be testimonial."
Thus, finding that a scientific lab report is a business record, or like a
business record, is one way courts outside of Idaho are dealing with the
confrontation issue in cases that involve scientific lab reports.

Consequently,

here, where the evidence shows that the raw data compilation and written chain
of custody are kept in the regular course of business activity according to
standard operating procedure (Tr. Vol.Ill, p.180, L.22 - p.181, L.1 O; p.191, Ls.1821 ), the data compilation and written chain of custody are not testimonial
evidence that triggers Crawford protection.

1

These high courts are not alone. A number of non-DNA cases cited by Watkins
in his supplemental brief have similarly concluded that scientific reports are
business records and, therefore, not subject to Crawford protection. See, g_,g__,_,
United States v. Wahila, 2006 WL 3523771, *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2006);
Rackoff v. State, 637 S.E.2d 706, 709 (Ga. 2006); Perkins v. State, 897 So.2d
457, 464 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); State v. Warlick, 2007 WL 1439648, *6 (Tenn.
App. 2007).
6

2.

Lab Reports That Contain Raw Data And Are Nonconclusory Are
Not Statements That Describe Past Facts Related To Criminal
Activity

Those courts that have admitted lab reports under the business record
exception have applied the three-factor inquiry born out of language in Crawford
and Davis. As identified above, that inquiry considers: 1) whether the statement
was made to a law enforcement officer or by or to a law enforcement agent, see
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53, and 2) is a statement that describes a past fact related
to criminal activity, for 3) possible use at a later trial, see Davis, --- U.S. at ---,
126 S.Ct. at 2273-74.
When applying these factors to DNA lab reports, courts have made an
important initial determination -- whether the lab report contains neutral scientific
data or rather conclusory scientific data analysis. Stated differently, courts look

at whether a report contains statements that reflect the gathering and processing
of evidence after the crime as opposed to whether that evidence links a particular
defendant to conduct in the past. This distinction is best illustrated by two DNA
cases: People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007), and Roberts v. United States,
916 A.2d 922 (D.C. App. 2007).
In Geier, the defendant asserted a Confrontation Clause violation to
testimony provided by the state's DNA expert, the director of a scientific lab. 161
P.3d at 131. The expert described the lab's protocol for receiving and testing
evidence and gave testimony on the issue of whether there was a DNA match of
semen found on the murder victim. J.g,_ The expert based her analysis on a report
from the lab technician that performed the DNA extraction (the process of
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gathering the DNA data).

11. at

131-33. The California Supreme Court rejected

the defendant's claim that the lab's protocol and reported DNA data that were
included in the report and that formed the basis of the expert's analysis were
testimonial.

11. at 140.

The court made a distinction between the DNA extraction

and the subsequent analysis regarding the existence of a match:
[The lab technician's] report and notes were generated as part of a
standardized scientific protocol that she conducted pursuant to her
employment at [the lab]. While the prosecutor undoubtedly hired
[the lab] in the hope of obtaining evidence against defendant, [the
technician] conducted her analysis, and made her notes and report,
as part of her job, not in order to incriminate defendant. Moreover,
to the extent [the technician]'s notes, forms and report merely
recount the procedures she used to analyze the DNA samples, they
are not themselves accusatory, as DNA analysis can lead to either
incriminatory or exculpatory results.
Finally, the accusatory
opinions in this case -- that defendant's DNA matched that taken
from the victim's vagina and that such a result was very unlikely
unless defendant was the donor -- were reached and conveyed not
through the nontestifying technician's laboratory notes and report,
but by the testifying witness, [the director of the lab].

11. at 140 (emphasis added).

On the basis of this reasoning, the court concluded

that neither the lab protocol nor the lab technician's report and notes were
testimonial hearsay for the purposes of Crawford and Davis:

"Records of

laboratory protocols followed and the resulting raw data acquired are not
accusatory" but "neutral."

11.

The California Supreme Court concluded that raw

DNA data was a present description of a present fact, the physical characteristics
of present evidence, and not an accusatory link between a past criminal act and
the defendant, i.e., whether the DNA samples match.
concluded that the raw data was not testimonial hearsay.
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Accordingly, the court

This distinction between raw DNA data gathering and data analysis is
highlighted by another case where the court found the opposite -- a right to
confront the lab report. Just as in Geier, in Roberts v. United States, 916 A.2d
922 (D.C. App. 2007), the Confrontation Clause issue arose when a scientist
testified as to the probability of a DNA match.

&

at 925. In Roberts, however,

the expert's testimony was not based solely on the raw data but was also "based
on the testimonial conclusions" of other scientists.

&

at 938. Those conclusions

were that the defendant could not be excluded as a contributor to the DNA
evidence -- the same conclusion made by the testifying witness. Id. at 937-38.
The defendant claimed he was entitled to cross-examine the testimony of the
non-testifying experts that rendered those conclusions, conclusions upon which
the testifying expert witness relied.

&

The court agreed, highlighting the fact

that the lab report included not only the underlying raw data that was gathered,
but the conclusions as to what the raw data, the extracted DNA, meant: "Our
review of the record confirms that, at feast in part, [the testifying expert]'s opinion
that appellant could not be excluded as a contributor to the DNA evidence rested
on the conclusions reached by the team that did the actual laboratory analysis
and set forth those conclusions in the report that he reviewed."

&

at 938

(emphasis added). Consequently, the court reasoned the defendant was entitled
to confront the scientists that made those accusatory conclusions linking him to
the criminal act.

&

The court made clear, however, that this was not a situation

were the lab report merely provided the raw data for the expert's independent
conclusion.

& at 938-39.
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This distinction is consistent with every DNA case where raw DNA data
alone provided the basis for a testifying expert's ultimate conclusion. See State
v. Lewis, 2007 WL 2332966, *14 (Tenn. 2007) (Tennessee Supreme Court
finding no right to confront where testifying expert concluded a DNA match based
on DNA extraction performed by another colleague); State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d
390, 399 (Ohio App. 2005) (finding Confrontation Clause violation when one
expert testified based on the conclusions of another: "For the purpose of trial, we
cannot find that this qualifies [the testifying expert] to testify to the conclusions of
[another expert]'s report when that report could not have been admitted into
evidence."); Veney v. United States, 929 A.2d 448, 469 (D.C. App. 2007) ("The
Confrontation Clause, nevertheless, was not violated by the fact that [the
testifying expert] derived her opinion from data generated by scientific tests
conducted by others, i.e., the serologist and PCR/STR technician.")
This distinction between data gathering and data analysis is consistent
with the Crawford and Davis framework for determining what is a testimonial
hearsay statement.

Geier, 161 P.3d at 104.

To begin with, there is no

accusatory statement in a report that only contains the raw data generated by a
scientific test. The report reflects the information produced by a scientific test -neutral and nonaccusatory data. In and of itself, the data has no connection to
either the defendant or any past criminal conduct. The information is merely a
contemporaneous recording of an observable scientific test.

Id.

It only has

meaning after the testifying expert witness analyzes the data and makes a
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conclusion. It is only at that point that a hearsay statement linking a past fact to
criminal conduct exists and the right to confront attaches.
Thus, in this case where the alleged testimonial hearsay is the DNA data
extraction, there is no violation of Crawford and Davis confrontation principles.
Here, just as in Geier, it is not the lab technician that extracted the DNA code
producing neutral data that established a past fact, but rather the expert witness
that analyzed and interpreted the neutral data and concluded that the semen
found in Watkins' six year-old daughter's underwear and bed belonged to
Watkins.
With this distinction in mind the reasoning in the long list of cases cited by
Watkins makes more sense. Moreover, it illustrates Watkins' misconception that
the dispositive factor in determining whether a hearsay statement is testimonial is
simply whether the statement was made in anticipation of litigation. (Appellant's
Brief, pp.8-9.) Where the lab report contains conclusions as a opposed to raw
data, the reason the court focuses on whether the report was prepared in
anticipation of trial is because the report links a past fact lo the defendant's
alleged criminal activity.
Consider the following scientific lab cases cited by Watkins for the
proposition that the controlling factor in the testimonial analysis is whether the
report is made in anticipation of trial -- in each case the lab report contained an
accusatory conclusion: Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 7 (D.C. 2006)
(chemist who drafted report that contained analysis and conclusions linking
defendant to criminal activity did not testify); Martin v. State, 936 So.2d 1190,
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1191 (Fla. App. 2006) (court focused on whether report was made in preparation
for trial after identifying the fact that the author of the report made conclusions
"that the substances seized from Martin [the defendant] w[as] contraband" and
did not testify); People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 610, 620 (Mich. App. 2005) (court
focused on whether statement was made in anticipation for trial after concluding
that report was "based on [non-testifying author]'s subjective observations and
analytic standards that established a fact critical to proving the alleged offense");
State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Mo. 2007) (court focused on the fact that
the admitted crime laboratory report was admitted without testimony and that the
report "concluded . . . that the substance was cocaine"); United States v.
Magyari, 63 M.J. 123, 127 (U.S. Armed Forces 2006) (scientist that made
accusatory conclusions in lab report did not testify); State v. Hawkins, 2007 WL
61874, *3 (Wash. App. 2007) (state conceded confrontation problem where
author of a criminal lab report concluding that there was no match between a
suspect's fingerprints and fingerprints found on a gun did not testify.)
These cases highlight the fact that each part of the three-factor inquiry
must be satisfied in order to find a hearsay statement testimonial -- not just
whether the report was prepared in anticipation of trial.2

2

Significantly, these

It should be noted that a number of the cases cited by Watkins directly refute
his contention that this Court should focus solely on whether the statement is
made an anticipation of trial. For example, in State v. Marshall, 114 Hawai'i 396,
401, 2007 WL 1793875, ***4 (Hawai'i App. 2007), the court rejected the
defendant's contention that statements in a report regarding the maintenance of
a breathalyzer machine were testimonial because the "statements were not
designed primarily to 'establish or prove' some past fact." (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Similarly, in People v. So Young Kim, 859 N.E.2d 92,
93 (Ill. App. 2006), the Illinois appellate court concluded that the certification
12

cases suggest that before a court even considers whether a lab report was made
in anticipation of trial the court first determines whether the information in the
report is merely a contemporaneous recording of an observable scientific test
that in and of itself does not link the defendant to a past criminal act. If it is, the
lab report is not testimonial. 3
In sum, in addition to considering whether a lab report is a business
record, courts outside of Idaho also consider the content of the lab report,
distinguishing between reports that contain raw data as opposed to accusatory
conclusions.

Where the report contains neutral raw data, courts have

consistently found those reports are not testimonial.

report of breathalyzer machine was not testimonial because the report was not
designed to link the defendant with a past fact: "Some courts have held that a
Breathalyzer certification is simply not accusatory: it does not accuse any
particular person of any particular crime." In State v. Miller, 144 P.3d 1052, 1058
(Or. App. 2006), an Oregon appellate court concluded that lab reports containing
conclusions as to the presence of drugs in the defendant's urine were testimonial
because the "lab reports at issue here are clearly intended to be used in a
criminal prosecution to prove past events."
3

The state acknowledges that there are a select few states that have held that
the determinative factor in determining whether a statement is testimonial is
whether a statement is prepared in anticipation of litigation. See, ~ , State v.
Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 309 (Minn. 2006) ("We have said the critical
determinative factor in assessing whether a statement is testimonial is whether it
was prepared for litigation."). This view, however, is clearly the exception and
not the rule. Crawford and Davis require courts to consider all the circumstances
under which the statement was made -- whether the statement was made in
anticipation of litigation is just one part of the analysis.
13

11.
Dr. Finis' Testimony Regarding How Her Lab Technician Handled And Tested
Samples Is Not lnadmissable Hearsay

A.

Introduction
Watkins argued for the first time in his reply brief that "Dr. Finis' testimony

as to what [the lab technician] did in handling and testing the evidence at issue in
this case is also inadmissible hearsay under 1.R.E. 801 and 802." (Appellant's
Reply Brief, p.10.) Watkins admits that this issue was not raised in his opening
brief. (Appellant's Reply Brief, p.10.) Watkins failed to preserve this issue on
appeal. Further, even if the issue was preserved, it has no merit because he has
not identified any out-of-court statement being offered for the truth of the matter
asserted.
B.

This Issue Has Been Eliminated From Consideration By Watkins' Failure
To Raise It In Her Opening Brief
The failure to include an issue in the statement of issues or address an

issue in an opening brief eliminates consideration of that issue on appeal.
Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 108, 982 P.2d 940, 943 (1999); State v.
Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959, 961, 783 P.2d 298, 300 (1989). A reviewing court
looks to the initial brief for the issues presented on appeal. Henman v. State,
132 Idaho 49, 51, 966 P.2d 49 (Ct. App. 1998). Issues raised for the first time in
a reply brief will not be addressed on appeal. Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho
685, 687, 905 P.2d 86, 88 (1995); State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763,
864 P.2d 596 (1993).

Watkins submitted an opening brief and the state fully

responded in its brief to the issues raised in that opening brief. Watkins filed a
reply brief where he argued, admittedly for the first time, that certain testimony
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was improperly admitted as inadmissible hearsay.

(Appellant's Reply Brief,

p.10.) As the cases cited make clear, an issue may not be raised for the first
time in a reply brief. Consequently, this issue is not properly before the Court.
C.

Dr. Finis's Statements Regarding How Her Lab Technician Handled And
Tested DNA Samples Are Not Inadmissible Hearsay

Watkins claims that the "DNA expert's testimony regarding how her lab
technician allegedly handled and tested certain evidence constituted inadmissible
hearsay under I.R.E. 801 and 802 .... " (Appellant's Supp. Brief, p.31.) This
argument has no merit for many reasons.
First, there is

no hearsay because there was no out-of-court statement

"offered into evidence." See I.R.E. 801 (c). Watkins has utterly failed to identify
any out-of-court statement in the record.
Watkins is required

Per Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6),

to identify the parts of the record upon which he relies.

Watkins has failed to do this.
Second, Watkins did not object to these statements at trial.
fundamental

"It is a

tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be

made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson,
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Here, where Watkins failed

to identify an out-of-court statement offered into evidence, he has similarly failed
to identify any objection he made to that claimed statement. Thus, Watkins failed

to preserve the issue for appeal.
Third, even if Watkins had identified a statement related to the technician's
handling and testing of evidence and had objected to that statement on hearsay
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grounds, these statements would be admissible under I.R.E. 703 and 803(6).
1.R.E. 703 allows for "facts or data" that are "of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject."
I.R.E. 803(6) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for "[a] memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions,
opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity" consistent with that businesses practice.

Dr.

Finis did testify that her lab has a standard operating procedure and that the lab
technician kept notes, a written chain of custody, that was part of a standard
operating procedure required to bring evidence into the lab. (Tr. Vol.Ill, p.180,
L.22 - p.181, L.20.) She also described the process of DNA extraction that led to
the raw DNA data that she analyzed and interpreted to make her conclusions.
(Tr. Vol.Ill, p.199, Ls.3-24.) Dr. Finis testified that the written chain of custody
and the notes pertaining to that extraction were kept pursuant to written standard
operating procedures. (Tr. Vol.Ill, p.180, L.22 - p.184, L.1; p.200, L.22 - p.201,
L.1.) The notes regarding the DNA extraction and the written chain of custody
are admissible per I.RE. 703 and 803(6) -- it is information of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts that is kept in the regular course of business.
Consequently, to the extent that Watkins is challenging the notes and written
chain of custody, Watkins' claim has no merit.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that Watkin's conviction be affirmed.

DATED this 7th day of November 2007.
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